# Non-Compete Enforceability in Queensland[^about] In Queensland a post-employment non-compete is presumptively void as a restraint of trade and binds a former employee only so far as it is reasonable; Queensland has no statutory read-down power, so courts apply the common-law blue-pencil rule only — they can delete severable words but cannot rewrite an overbroad clause, and a clause that severance cannot save fails entirely. ## Are employee non-competes enforceable in Queensland? {#enforceability} **Short answer.** Only so far as they are reasonable. A post-employment non-compete is treated as a restraint of trade, which the courts presume is void as contrary to public policy unless the employer shows it goes no further than is reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate business interest [^aeci-presumed-void]. The most recent appellate statement of the rule in Queensland puts it directly: a restraint stands only if it is proven reasonable between the parties and is not unreasonable in the public interest [^reims-invalid-unless-reasonable]. Queensland is not a per se ban jurisdiction, and it has no statute that sets fixed numeric limits on duration or area. It is a reasonableness jurisdiction built entirely on the common-law restraint-of-trade doctrine. The starting point is that every post-employment covenant is presumptively unenforceable, and the burden is on the employer to justify it [^autoparts-onus]. "A restraint will be invalid unless it is proven to be reasonable as between the parties or if proven to be unreasonable in the public interest."[^reims-invalid-unless-reasonable] Courts apply the doctrine more strictly to employment covenants than to covenants in commercial deals: a buyer of a business may protect itself from competition by the seller, but an employer may not protect itself from competition by an employee as such [^aeci-competition-per-se]. The foundational High Court authorities — *Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co* and *Buckley v Tutty* — establish the same framework that Queensland courts continue to apply today. The sections that follow work through whether a court can narrow an overbroad clause, why cascading clauses matter so much, what counts as a legitimate interest, how reasonableness of scope is judged, and the open question of whether a breach can extend the restraint. ## Can a Queensland court narrow an overbroad non-compete? {#court-narrowing} **Short answer.** Only in a limited way, and far less generously than many employers assume. Queensland has no statute that lets a court read an overbroad restraint down to a reasonable level. A court applies the common-law blue-pencil rule only: it can delete grammatically severable words if what remains is reasonable and the contract still makes sense, but it cannot read down, add to, or rewrite the clause [^autoparts-no-rewrite]. If severance cannot save the clause, the whole restraint fails. This is the single most important practical point about Queensland restraint law, and it is what most distinguishes Queensland practice. Severance is mechanical, not editorial. A provision can be severed only if it is divisible and can be deleted without materially modifying the effect of what remains; the parties can also expressly provide that each obligation operates independently and is severable [^autoparts-severance]. What a court will not do is approach the clause by first deciding what level of restriction would have been reasonable and then trimming the words to fit — that impermissible approach is reading the clause down to save it, and Queensland courts refuse to do it [^aeci-no-read-down]. "it is not permissible for the Court to approach the construction of a restraint clause by first determining what degree of restriction would be justified; and then reading down an unduly wide clause in order to preserve its validity."[^aeci-no-read-down] A recent Supreme Court decision shows the limit in action. Faced with an extremely broad definition driving the restraint, the Court — at an interlocutory stage — considered that the argument for validity faced real challenges, on the view that the offending words were not capable of being severed, read down, or supplemented [^maglis-cannot-be-severed]. That was a provisional assessment on an interlocutory application rather than a final holding of invalidity, but the lesson for drafters is the same: an overbroad Queensland covenant whose breadth cannot be cleanly excised is at real risk of failing entirely rather than being narrowed by the court. > [!CAUTION] > **Drafting note.** > > Because a Queensland court will not read an overbroad restraint down to a reasonable level — it can only delete severable words and cannot rewrite the clause — draft scope, area, and duration to the minimum the legitimate interest actually requires [^aeci-no-read-down]. Build the clause from separate, independently severable covenants rather than one sweeping prohibition, so that if the widest covenant is unreasonable a narrower one can still stand on its own [^autoparts-severance]. ## Are cascading or ladder restraint clauses valid in Queensland? {#cascading-clauses} **Short answer.** Yes, within limits, and they are essential drafting in Queensland precisely because a court cannot read an overbroad clause down. A cascading clause sets out a menu of progressively narrower combinations of period and area, each expressed as a separate, severable restraint, so that if the widest is unreasonable a narrower rung can still be enforced on its own. Queensland courts accept that, within certain limits, a contract may contain cascading restraint of trade clauses [^autoparts-cascading]. The reason cascading clauses are the standard route to survive blue-pencil severance follows directly from the no-read-down rule. Since a court can only delete severable words and will not rewrite the bargain, the drafter does the narrowing in advance by writing several independent covenants. In *Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper*, the employment contract used exactly this structure — a six-month restraint, then three months, then two months, then one month — and the Court enforced the six-month rung as reasonable, treating the ladder as a set of separate covenants rather than a single clause requiring judicial editing [^autoparts-cascading]. A cascade only works if each rung is genuinely independent and severable. A provision can be cut out only where it is divisible and can be deleted without materially modifying what remains, and the parties should expressly state that each restraint operates independently [^autoparts-severance-cascade]. The opposite drafting choice is dangerous: where the breadth comes from a single definition woven through the operative words, the offending language cannot simply be struck out, and the whole restraint can fail [^maglis-sever-definition]. > [!CAUTION] > **Drafting note.** > > A cascading clause is the practical answer to Queensland's no-read-down rule, but only if each rung is a self-contained, reasonable restraint that can stand after the wider rungs are deleted [^autoparts-severance-cascade]. Do not bury the breadth in a defined term that runs through every rung — if the unreasonable element sits inside a single definition rather than in a separable covenant, a court cannot blue-pencil it out and the clause may fail in its entirety [^maglis-sever-definition]. ## What legitimate interest must an employer show to enforce a Queensland non-compete? {#legitimate-interest} **Short answer.** A protectable business interest — not a mere wish to avoid competition. An employer cannot restrain a former employee simply because a rival might benefit; an employer must be prepared to face the competition of a former employee if it comes [^lindner-face-competition]. The recognised interests are the employer's customer connection and goodwill and its confidential information and trade secrets [^aeci-confidential-restraint]. The dividing line drawn in *Lindner v Murdock's Garage* is between protecting an asset and suppressing a rival. A covenant aimed at competition by itself, rather than at a recognised interest, is invalid [^lindner-face-competition]. An employee's own general skill, experience, and know-how are the employee's to use — in one Queensland decision the court underlined that the worker was the employer's employee, not their slave [^gbar-not-slave]. "An employer must be prepared to face the competition of a former employee if it comes."[^lindner-face-competition] Confidential information is a recognised interest in its own right, and a restraint protecting it need not be limited to a bare non-disclosure promise: it may stop the employee from joining a competitive business that could use the information [^aeci-confidential-restraint]. The practical point for drafters is that the interest has to be identified and real. An employer who cannot point to a genuine customer connection, goodwill, or confidential-information interest cannot enforce the clause whatever its scope. > [!CAUTION] > **Drafting note.** > > A clause that simply bars a former employee from joining or starting a competing business, without tying the restraint to a specific protectable interest, is the weakest position, because an employer is not entitled to protection against competition as such [^lindner-face-competition]. Identify the actual interest — the customer connection, the goodwill, or the confidential information — and draft the restraint around it; a covenant protecting confidential information can extend to barring work for a competitor that could use that information [^aeci-confidential-restraint]. ## How long and how wide can a Queensland non-compete be? {#reasonableness-factors} **Short answer.** There is no statutory limit; reasonableness is decided case by case on the activity restrained, the geographic area, the duration, and the employee's seniority and actual customer influence. Reasonableness is tested as at the date the contract was made, not by hindsight [^autoparts-tested-at-contract]. A geographic area wider than the employer's business reaches, or a period longer than is needed to protect the interest, is likely to be unreasonable [^lindner-area-too-wide]. Because the limits are judge-made, there is no fixed ceiling to anchor a covenant, and the analysis cuts both ways. In *Lindner v Murdock's Garage* the High Court held an area covenant void because the area it covered was wider than the employer's business reasonably required [^lindner-area-too-wide]. By contrast, in *Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper* the Supreme Court enforced a six-month, statewide restraint on senior managers, treating that scope as reasonable given their seniority and customer contact. On duration, the usual question for a customer-connection interest is how long it takes for the former employee's influence over clients to fade — one test is to ask how long it will take the connection between the ex-employee and the customer to die away [^autoparts-die-away]. The parties' own statement that a restraint is reasonable carries some weight but does not bind the court [^autoparts-acknowledgement-not-binding]. There is no fixed numeric ceiling: a six-month restraint on senior managers was held reasonable in *Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper*, and as a general matter longer periods attract closer scrutiny and require a correspondingly stronger interest to justify them. "One test is to ask how long it will take the connection between the ex-employee and the customer to die away."[^autoparts-die-away] ## Do paid restraints, garden leave, and fresh consideration help in Queensland? {#garden-leave} **Short answer.** They can strengthen an employer's position, but they do not displace the reasonableness requirement. A restraint the employee was paid to accept is more likely to be enforced, and a court gives weight to what the parties negotiated — though their own acknowledgement that a clause is reasonable does not bind the court [^autoparts-acknowledgement-not-binding-gl]. Garden leave, where the employee stays employed and paid through a notice period, is assessed against the same reasonableness framework rather than being automatically valid; a restraint the employee is paid to observe weighs in favour of enforcement. Queensland decisions treat consideration paid for a restraint as a meaningful factor. In *AECI Australia Pty Ltd v Convey* the employee had bargained for and been paid a sum the court described as the value of one year of the employee's salary in return for the restraint, and the court regarded that payment as significant support for the clause's reasonableness, even though it ultimately refused interlocutory relief for other reasons [^aeci-paid-restraint]. As a matter of doctrine, garden leave does not sit in a special category: a period in which the employer continues to pay the employee not to compete is assessed against the same reasonableness framework as any other restraint, and the fact that the employee is being paid to observe the restriction is a factor that weighs in favour of enforcement rather than a guarantee of it. For mid-employment restraints — covenants introduced after the employee is already on foot — the practical concern is that validity is tested as at the date the restraint is made [^autoparts-tested-at-contract-gl], so a restraint added later is judged on the circumstances then, not on the original hiring, and needs its own consideration. ## What if the employer wrongfully dismissed the employee? {#employer-breach} **Short answer.** The restraint may fall away. The employer carries the onus of proving the restraint reasonable in the first place [^lindner-onus], so an employer seeking an injunction already starts from a position where it must justify the covenant. Beyond that, the long-standing common-law principle associated with *General Billposting Co Ltd v Atkinson* [1909] AC 118 is that an employer who wrongfully dismisses an employee — for example by repudiating the contract through a dismissal without the notice the contract requires — generally cannot afterwards enforce a post-employment restraint against that employee. The staged Queensland authorities here do not themselves decide that point, so it is best treated as a general principle a court may apply rather than a settled Queensland rule. The reasonableness analysis assumes a clause the employer is entitled to rely on, and the employer bears the onus of establishing that reasonableness [^lindner-onus]. Where the employer is the party in serious breach, a court may, applying the general common-law principle, treat the employee as released from the covenant; and in any event the equitable remedy an employer needs — chiefly an injunction — is discretionary and sensitive to the employer's own conduct. > [!NOTE] > **Practice note.** > > The employer already bears the onus of proving the restraint reasonable before any question of its own breach arises [^lindner-onus]. On top of that, an employer that terminates abruptly — without giving contractual notice or paying in lieu — may risk losing the very non-compete it wants to rely on, because under the general common-law principle a repudiatory breach by the employer can release the employee from the restraint. That repudiation point is not settled by the Queensland authorities discussed here, so treat it as a risk rather than a certainty: before suing to enforce a covenant, confirm that the termination itself complied with the contract. ## Does a Queensland non-compete pause or extend if the employee breaches? {#tolling} **Short answer.** This is an open question, and an employer should not assume the clock stops. No settled Queensland authority holds that a restraint period tolls — pauses and then resumes — while a former employee is in breach or while litigation runs. Reasonableness is determined as at the date of the agreement [^autoparts-tested-at-contract-tolling], which sits uneasily with a clause that purports to lengthen the restraint automatically depending on the employee's later conduct. Because validity is fixed at the date of contract, a drafting device that extends the period by the length of any breach pushes the effective duration beyond what was assessed as reasonable at the outset, and there is no clear Queensland authority validating it. Australian courts tend to treat rolling or indefinite restraints with suspicion and to prefer addressing a breach through a tailored injunction or damages rather than by extending the restraint period. The safer assumption is that the stated period is the maximum the employer can rely on. > [!CAUTION] > **Drafting note.** > > Do not rely on a clause that purports to extend the non-compete by the length of any breach. No clear Queensland authority validates tolling of the restraint period, and because reasonableness is determined as at the date of the agreement, an automatic extension risks being treated as unreasonable [^autoparts-tested-at-contract-tolling]. Treat the stated duration as the maximum and address an actual breach through an injunction or a damages claim instead. ## Do Queensland restraint rules differ for contractors and business sales? {#contractors-and-sale} **Short answer.** Yes, in different directions. Restraints on independent contractors are assessed under the same restraint-of-trade doctrine as employee covenants — the same legitimate-interest requirement and the same no-wider-than-necessary test — so the label of the relationship matters less than the substance of the interest the restraint actually protects. Restraints given by the seller of a business, by contrast, are judged much more leniently, because a buyer is entitled to protect the goodwill it paid for [^lindner-sale-distinction]. The sale-of-business leniency is long-standing and uncontroversial — it predates *Lindner* and has never been in doubt, so the way the point is expressed in that case (in a judgment that dissented on the ultimate outcome) reflects settled doctrine rather than any minority view. A restraint in a sale agreement is more easily upheld than the same restraint in an employment contract [^lindner-sale-more-easily], because the policy concerns that make employment covenants suspect — unequal bargaining power and the risk of locking a person out of their livelihood — are weaker when a vendor sells a business for value and promises not to compete away the goodwill just sold. The Court of Appeal has drawn the same line in reverse: a party whose business model merely depends on another's future activity, and who imposes a non-compete to protect that future income rather than purchased goodwill, is more readily seen as merely anticompetitive and requires closer scrutiny [^reims-anticompetitive]. For contractors, the key question is the same one that governs employees: is there a legitimate interest, and is the scope no wider than necessary to protect it. The label matters less than the substance of the relationship and the interest at stake. ## Is a federal ban on non-competes coming to Australia? {#federal-reform} **Short answer.** A ban has been proposed but is not yet law, and as of June 2026 the common-law restraint-of-trade framework above still governs in Queensland [^reims-still-governs]. According to Australian Government Treasury material and law-firm commentary, the Government announced in the 2025–26 Federal Budget that it intends to ban post-employment non-competes for workers earning under the Fair Work Act high-income threshold (reported at around AUD $183,100), with Treasury running a consultation on the design, and the reform expected to be legislated during 2026 and to take effect from 2027, operating prospectively. Those figures and dates come from that secondary material — Treasury announcements and commentary — not from any enacted statute. Until any ban is enacted, the existing common-law framework continues to govern [^reims-still-governs]. The proposal, as described in current Treasury material and law-firm commentary rather than in any enacted statute, would cover most employees earning below the high-income threshold while excluding sale-of-business covenants and restraints on higher earners. Non-solicitation, no-poach, and wage-fixing arrangements are also reported to be under consideration. None of this is in force, and the precise scope, threshold, and commencement could change before any legislation passes; the threshold figure and the 2026/2027 timeline in particular are drawn from secondary reporting and should be re-checked against the enacted text when it appears. Because this is a future legislative matter, employers should treat the timeline and detail as provisional rather than settled. A covenant entered into now is governed by existing Queensland law; whether and how a future ban would affect existing or new agreements will depend on the enacted text and its transitional provisions. > [!NOTE] > **Practice note.** > > Do not draft to a federal ban that does not yet exist. As of June 2026 no Commonwealth statute bans employee non-competes, so enforceability in Queensland still turns on the common-law reasonableness test and the blue-pencil-only severance rule [^reims-still-governs]. Track the proposal through to enacted legislation before changing practice, because its threshold, scope, and commencement remain proposals subject to change. [^about]: By Steven Obiajulu, J.D. Published by [openagreements.org](https://openagreements.org). Last reviewed 2026-06-10. License: CC BY 4.0. Steven Obiajulu, J.D. is not admitted to practise law in Queensland, Australia. This article summarizes publicly available Queensland, Australia legal sources for general information only — it is not legal advice and does not create a lawyer–client relationship. It may not reflect the most recent legal developments and is provided without warranty as to accuracy or completeness; verify against the primary sources cited and consult a locally qualified lawyer before relying on it. [^aeci-presumed-void]: **AECI Australia Pty Ltd v Convey** — "A term in a contract, which is a restraint of trade ('a restraint clause'), is presumed to be void as contrary to public policy." *AECI Australia Pty Ltd v Convey [2020] QSC 207 (Bradley J), quoting Just Group Ltd v Peck (2016) 344 ALR 162.* [^reims-invalid-unless-reasonable]: **Reims Investments Pty Ltd v City Fertility Sydney CBD Pty Ltd** — "A restraint will be invalid unless it is proven to be reasonable as between the parties or if proven to be unreasonable in the public interest." *Reims Investments Pty Ltd v City Fertility Sydney CBD Pty Ltd [2025] QCA 243 (Doyle JA).* [^autoparts-onus]: **Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper** — "The party who seeks to enforce the restraint has the onus of proving that the restraint is reasonable as between the parties." *Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper [2015] QSC 155, quoting Vision Eye Institute Ltd v Kitchen [2014] QSC 260.* [^aeci-competition-per-se]: **AECI Australia Pty Ltd v Convey** — "a purchaser of a business is entitled to protect itself from competition by the vendor; but an employer is not entitled to protect itself from competition per se by an employee." *AECI Australia Pty Ltd v Convey [2020] QSC 207 (Bradley J), quoting Just Group Ltd v Peck (2016) 344 ALR 162.* [^autoparts-no-rewrite]: **Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper** — "Courts will not rewrite the parties' contract for them. However, within certain limits which are not alleged to have been exceeded in this case, a contract may contain cascading restraint of trade clauses." *Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper [2015] QSC 155, quoting Vision Eye Institute Ltd v Kitchen [2014] QSC 260.* [^autoparts-severance]: **Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper** — "Provisions in a restrictive covenant may be severed if they are capable of being regarded as divisible and deleted without materially modifying the effect of what remains. In addition, the parties may expressly provide that each obligation has independent operation and is severable." *Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper [2015] QSC 155, quoting Vision Eye Institute Ltd v Kitchen [2014] QSC 260.* [^aeci-no-read-down]: **AECI Australia Pty Ltd v Convey** — "it is not permissible for the Court to approach the construction of a restraint clause by first determining what degree of restriction would be justified; and then reading down an unduly wide clause in order to preserve its validity." *AECI Australia Pty Ltd v Convey [2020] QSC 207 (Bradley J), quoting Just Group Ltd v Peck (2016) 344 ALR 162.* [^maglis-cannot-be-severed]: **Perpetual Limited v Maglis** — "I consider the argument for validity of the restraint clause has real challenges, having regard to the extremely broad definition of ‘Client’, which I do not accept is capable of being severed, read down, or read with additional words, as submitted by the applicants." *Perpetual Limited v Maglis [2025] QSC 71 (Bowskill CJ).* [^autoparts-cascading]: **Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper** — "Courts will not rewrite the parties' contract for them. However, within certain limits which are not alleged to have been exceeded in this case, a contract may contain cascading restraint of trade clauses." *Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper [2015] QSC 155, quoting Vision Eye Institute Ltd v Kitchen [2014] QSC 260.* [^autoparts-severance-cascade]: **Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper** — "Provisions in a restrictive covenant may be severed if they are capable of being regarded as divisible and deleted without materially modifying the effect of what remains. In addition, the parties may expressly provide that each obligation has independent operation and is severable." *Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper [2015] QSC 155, quoting Vision Eye Institute Ltd v Kitchen [2014] QSC 260.* [^maglis-sever-definition]: **Perpetual Limited v Maglis** — "I consider the argument for validity of the restraint clause has real challenges, having regard to the extremely broad definition of ‘Client’, which I do not accept is capable of being severed, read down, or read with additional words, as submitted by the applicants." *Perpetual Limited v Maglis [2025] QSC 71 (Bowskill CJ).* [^lindner-face-competition]: **Lindner v Murdock's Garage** — "An employer must be prepared to face the competition of a former employee if it comes." *Lindner v Murdock's Garage [1950] HCA 48; (1950) 83 CLR 628 (per McTiernan J).* [^aeci-confidential-restraint]: **AECI Australia Pty Ltd v Convey** — "It may restrain the employee from being involved with a competitive business that could use the confidential information." *AECI Australia Pty Ltd v Convey [2020] QSC 207 (Bradley J), quoting Just Group Ltd v Peck (2016) 344 ALR 162.* [^gbar-not-slave]: **GBAR (Australia) Pty Ltd v Brown** — "He was GBAR's employee, not their slave." *GBAR (Australia) Pty Ltd v Brown [2020] QSC 14 (Bradley J).* [^autoparts-tested-at-contract]: **Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper** — "The reasonableness of the restraint is determined at the date of entry into the agreement." *Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper [2015] QSC 155, quoting Vision Eye Institute Ltd v Kitchen [2014] QSC 260.* [^lindner-area-too-wide]: **Lindner v Murdock's Garage** — "I think it must be held that the area was unreasonably wide." *Lindner v Murdock's Garage [1950] HCA 48; (1950) 83 CLR 628 (per McTiernan J).* [^autoparts-die-away]: **Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper** — "One test is to ask how long it will take the connection between the ex-employee and the customer to die away." *Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper [2015] QSC 155, quoting Vision Eye Institute Ltd v Kitchen [2014] QSC 260.* [^autoparts-acknowledgement-not-binding]: **Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper** — "However, a declaration by a party that a restraint is reasonable does not bind the court." *Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper [2015] QSC 155, quoting Vision Eye Institute Ltd v Kitchen [2014] QSC 260.* [^autoparts-acknowledgement-not-binding-gl]: **Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper** — "However, a declaration by a party that a restraint is reasonable does not bind the court." *Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper [2015] QSC 155, quoting Vision Eye Institute Ltd v Kitchen [2014] QSC 260.* [^aeci-paid-restraint]: **AECI Australia Pty Ltd v Convey** — "AECI was prepared to pay a significant sum (namely one year of the Employee's salary) for the right it seeks to vindicate" *AECI Australia Pty Ltd v Convey [2020] QSC 207 (Bradley J).* [^autoparts-tested-at-contract-gl]: **Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper** — "The reasonableness of the restraint is determined at the date of entry into the agreement." *Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper [2015] QSC 155, quoting Vision Eye Institute Ltd v Kitchen [2014] QSC 260.* [^lindner-onus]: **Lindner v Murdock's Garage** — "The onus was on the plaintiff firm to prove circumstances showing that the restriction on the defendant's freedom to work was reasonable." *Lindner v Murdock's Garage [1950] HCA 48; (1950) 83 CLR 628 (per McTiernan J).* [^autoparts-tested-at-contract-tolling]: **Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper** — "The reasonableness of the restraint is determined at the date of entry into the agreement." *Auto Parts Group Pty Ltd v Cooper [2015] QSC 155, quoting Vision Eye Institute Ltd v Kitchen [2014] QSC 260.* [^lindner-sale-distinction]: **Lindner v Murdock's Garage** — "A distinction is drawn between a restraint upon trade included in an agreement for the sale of a business and a restraint included in an agreement with an employee." *Lindner v Murdock's Garage [1950] HCA 48; (1950) 83 CLR 628 (per Latham CJ).* [^lindner-sale-more-easily]: **Lindner v Murdock's Garage** — "The restraint is more easily upheld in the former than in the latter case." *Lindner v Murdock's Garage [1950] HCA 48; (1950) 83 CLR 628 (per Latham CJ).* [^reims-anticompetitive]: **Reims Investments Pty Ltd v City Fertility Sydney CBD Pty Ltd** — "The latter is more readily described as merely anticompetitive and requires closer scrutiny." *Reims Investments Pty Ltd v City Fertility Sydney CBD Pty Ltd [2025] QCA 243 (Doyle JA).* [^reims-still-governs]: **Reims Investments Pty Ltd v City Fertility Sydney CBD Pty Ltd** — "A restraint will be invalid unless it is proven to be reasonable as between the parties or if proven to be unreasonable in the public interest." *Reims Investments Pty Ltd v City Fertility Sydney CBD Pty Ltd [2025] QCA 243 (Doyle JA).*