# Privilege across a counsel transition[^about] How to preserve privilege during a counsel transition, including file transfers, AI search, matter summaries, billing narratives, and disputes. ## Does changing outside counsel waive privilege over company files? {#does-changing-outside-counsel-waive-privilege-over-company-files} **Short answer.** Usually no. Attorney-client privilege generally remains with the company when only the outside law firm changes, but file transfer and deal-room structure can create separate waiver problems. Corporate privilege is still client-centric. `Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)` grounded the doctrine in "full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients"[^upjohn-co-v-united-states-449-u-s-383-1981]. `Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985)` then made the control point explicit: "the authority to assert and waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege passes as well"[^commodity-futures-trading-comm-n-v-weintraub-471] when control passes. [^upjohn-co-v-united-states-449-u-s-383-1981][^commodity-futures-trading-comm-n-v-weintraub-471] A substitution of outside counsel, without a change in client control, is therefore not ordinarily a waiver event. The law firm is changing; the privilege holder is not. The file-transfer cases point in the same direction, but with sharper edges. `Sage Realty Corp. v. Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn LLP, 91 N.Y.2d 30 (1997)` adopted the modern entire-file presumption in New York and emphasized the client's claim to work-product materials "for the creation of which they paid"[^sage-realty-corp-v-proskauer-rose-goetz-mendelso]. [^sage-realty-corp-v-proskauer-rose-goetz-mendelso] ABA Formal Opinion 471 treats surrender of electronic and paper files as part of protecting the client on termination, and ABA Formal Opinion 489 treats an orderly handoff as part of the same ethical frame when lawyers change firms. [^aba-formal-opinion-471-ethical-obligations-of-la][^aba-formal-opinion-489-obligations-related-to-no] NYSBA Opinion 1212 is useful because it marks the boundary more cleanly: absent client consent, a file can move to the client or successor counsel, but not to a nonlawyer program that does not itself represent the client. [^new-york-state-bar-association-ethics-opinion-12] In transaction settings, `Tekni-Plex, Inc. v. Meyner & Landis, 89 N.Y.2d 123 (1996)` adds that operational privilege and merger-negotiation privilege may not move together, which matters for any AI-indexed deal room treated as one undifferentiated archive. [^tekni-plex-inc-v-meyner-landis-89-n-y-2d-123-199] - ## Can AI search of privileged files waive attorney-client privilege? {#can-ai-search-of-privileged-files-waive-attorney-client-privilege} **Short answer.** It can, depending on access, retention, reuse, and counsel supervision. Courts and commentators are treating AI search as an ordinary confidentiality and third-party disclosure problem, not as a categorical AI exception. That is why the live waiver rules still sit in the mechanics, not the substitution. Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b) preserves privilege after inadvertent disclosure only if the holder took "reasonable steps to prevent disclosure"[^federal-rule-of-evidence-502-b] and promptly tried to fix the mistake. [^federal-rule-of-evidence-502-b] `Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251 (D. Md. 2008)` remains the warning that weak screening and slow remediation can destroy the protection. [^victor-stanley-inc-v-creative-pipe-inc-250-f-r-d] Third-party access is still analyzed through older agency cases rather than special AI doctrine. `United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961)` protects necessary intermediaries; `Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236 (1st Cir. 2002)` rejects mere convenience; and `United States v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 129 F.3d 681 (1st Cir. 1997)` treated disclosure outside the confidentiality circle as enough to lose both privilege and work product. [^united-states-v-kovel-296-f-2d-918-2d-cir-1961][^cavallaro-v-united-states-284-f-3d-236-1st-cir-2][^united-states-v-massachusetts-institute-of-techn] That same logic is why e-billing narratives are awkward. NYSBA Opinion 716 does not treat invoices as privileged in the abstract; it treats them as potentially privileged only when they reveal motive, strategy, or the specific legal work performed. [^new-york-state-bar-association-ethics-opinion-71] On AI, the firms are even closer together. Perkins Coie, Sidley Austin, Blank Rome, Proskauer, and Gibson Dunn all treat the first 2026 cases as architecture cases rather than philosophical AI cases. [^perkins-coie-heppner-and-gilbarco-courts-apply-p][^sidley-austin-generative-ai-and-privilege-practi][^blank-rome-ai-privilege-and-work-product-conflic][^proskauer-rose-recent-federal-privilege-ruling-r][^gibson-dunn-ai-privilege-waivers-sdny-rules-agai] Consumer tools with monitoring, training, or broad disclosure rights look like ordinary third-party recipients. Bounded enterprise deployments improve the record, but they do not finish the argument. The striking gap is that almost none of the firm commentary can point to a case about embeddings or AI-indexed deal rooms specifically. The firms are reasoning by analogy from `Kovel`, `Heppner`, `Warner`, and ordinary waiver law. That last point is probably the most useful synthesis from the firm layer. No serious source in the record says embeddings are automatically safe. None says they are automatically waiving either. The commentary instead keeps reducing the issue to the same variables courts already understand: Was the system consumer or enterprise? Did the vendor have reuse rights? Was the use directed by counsel? Could the data escape the matter boundary? Those are old privilege questions with new plumbing. - Changing firms is the easy part. Re-hosting the matter into company-wide search, AI note-taking, or retrieval layers is the harder part. A handoff from one law firm system to another usually preserves the same client-controlled story. A handoff from outside counsel into a broad enterprise knowledge layer raises a different question: whether the system is still acting as bounded infrastructure or has become another recipient of the substance. [^aba-formal-opinion-512-generative-artificial-int][^perkins-coie-heppner-and-gilbarco-courts-apply-p] - Enterprise vendor terms now function as privilege facts. No-training promises, zero-retention settings, and processor-style confidentiality commitments make the nonwaiver argument better; they do not make it automatic. The more the system looks like a reusable public service, the more the record starts to resemble the `Heppner` commentaries rather than `Warner`. [^openai-enterprise-privacy][^openai-help-center-managing-data-sharing-and-pri][^microsoft-copilot-chat-privacy-and-protections][^microsoft-enterprise-data-protection-in-microsof][^proskauer-rose-recent-federal-privilege-ruling-r] - Whether creating embeddings from privileged files is itself a disclosure remains open. One side analogizes embeddings to OCR, search indexing, or TAR inside a confidential environment. The other side sees derivative representations stored or reused by a vendor, which could look much closer to third-party exposure. We have not found a reported appellate decision in the source set that squarely decides it. [^united-states-v-kovel-296-f-2d-918-2d-cir-1961][^aba-formal-opinion-512-generative-artificial-int][^sidley-austin-generative-ai-and-privilege-practi] - Whether enterprise no-training terms are enough to fit a `Kovel`-type theory is unresolved. Firms increasingly argue that private, counsel-directed AI can look like a supervised legal-services adjunct. Courts may still insist on a narrower, more formal intermediary role than most SaaS contracts provide. [^united-states-v-kovel-296-f-2d-918-2d-cir-1961][^cavallaro-v-united-states-284-f-3d-236-1st-cir-2][^blank-rome-ai-privilege-and-work-product-conflic] ## Are AI matter summaries and billing narratives privileged? {#are-ai-matter-summaries-and-billing-narratives-privileged} **Short answer.** They may be, but only when the summary or narrative reveals legal judgment or lawyer-directed work product. Raw business facts remain discoverable even when they sit in a legal workspace. `Warner v. Gilbarco Inc. et al., Case No. 2:24-cv-12333 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 10, 2026)` shows how the AI overlay may fit into that older structure. On the record before it, the court treated AI-assisted drafting as work product and said "ChatGPT (and other generative AI programs) are tools, not persons"[^warner-v-gilbarco-inc-et-al-case-no-2-24-cv-1233]. [^warner-v-gilbarco-inc-et-al-case-no-2-24-cv-1233] That does not answer the harder embeddings question. It does show that courts are already separating attorney-client privilege from work-product analysis and looking closely at the actual technical and contractual facts. - E-billing narratives, AI summaries, and diligence syntheses can be more sensitive than the raw underlying documents. Raw business facts do not become privileged merely because they sit in a legal workspace. [^upjohn-co-v-united-states-449-u-s-383-1981-2] But a narrative, summary, or issue list can encode mental impressions and later become the precise object of a discovery fight, especially if the company later puts fees or mitigation at issue. [^hickman-v-taylor-329-u-s-495-1947][^new-york-state-bar-association-ethics-opinion-71-2] - Whether AI-generated matter summaries are privileged, work product, both, or neither is also unsettled. Perhaps lawyer-directed summaries that reflect issue selection and legal framing will look like work product. Perhaps courts will treat them as only factual compilations if they do not materially reveal mental impressions. `Upjohn` still limits the ceiling: underlying facts remain discoverable even when the communication channel is protected. [^upjohn-co-v-united-states-449-u-s-383-1981-2][^hickman-v-taylor-329-u-s-495-1947][^warner-v-gilbarco-inc-et-al-case-no-2-24-cv-1233] ## Can former counsel get successor-counsel files in malpractice disputes? {#can-former-counsel-get-successor-counsel-files-in-malpractice-disputes} **Short answer.** Sometimes. Work product may outlast attorney-client privilege, but courts split on whether successor-counsel communications must be disclosed once malpractice, fees, mitigation, or settlement reasonableness becomes disputed. Work product is tougher, but not uniform across successor-counsel disputes. `Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947)` protects interview notes and mental impressions because otherwise much of that work would remain unwritten. [^hickman-v-taylor-329-u-s-495-1947-2] On the successor-counsel question, `Fischel & Kahn, Ltd. v. Van Straaten Gallery, Inc., 189 Ill. 2d 579 (2000)` and `Miller v. Superior Court, 111 Cal. App. 3d 390 (1980)` protected later communications where successor counsel arrived after the alleged wrong was already complete. [^fischel-kahn-ltd-v-van-straaten-gallery-inc-189][^miller-v-superior-court-hession-111-cal-app-3d-3] `Pappas v. Holloway, 114 Wash. 2d 198, 787 P.2d 30 (1990)` went the other way when withholding successor-counsel communications would deny the original lawyers information the court considered vital to their defense. [^pappas-v-holloway-114-wash-2d-198-787-p-2d-30-19] The split predates AI, but AI-era transitions will likely make it more visible because summaries, logs, and billing narratives create more artifacts about the handoff itself. On successor-counsel communications, the firm commentary is more aligned than the case law. McGuireWoods states the split plainly: some courts force disclosure of successor-counsel communications in malpractice disputes and others do not. [^mcguirewoods-clients-suing-their-lawyers-for-mal] Hinshaw & Culbertson frames the disclosure-friendly line as an at-issue problem, not a categorical rule: once a client makes later legal advice central to causation, mitigation, or settlement reasonableness, the privilege position weakens. [^hinshaw-culbertson-plaintiff-s-malpractice-suit] McAndrew Vuotto reads New Jersey's `Lane Construction` line the same way. [^mcandrew-vuotto-new-jersey-decision-potentially] The shared conclusion is narrow but important: the danger often grows after the transition, when the transition itself becomes evidence in a later fee or malpractice fight. - When a transition becomes a malpractice or fee fight, work product may outlast privilege, but not uniformly. Illinois and California are friendlier to successor-counsel secrecy than Washington. That state split means the legal posture after the handoff can matter as much as the handoff itself. [^fischel-kahn-ltd-v-van-straaten-gallery-inc-189][^miller-v-superior-court-hession-111-cal-app-3d-3][^pappas-v-holloway-114-wash-2d-198-787-p-2d-30-19][^mcguirewoods-clients-suing-their-lawyers-for-mal] - How far successor-counsel waiver goes once the dispute turns adversarial is still jurisdiction-specific. The split between `Miller` and `Fischel`, on one side, and `Pappas`, on the other, is old. AI-era transitions may make the factual record denser because summaries, billing narratives, and transfer logs can themselves become exhibits in the later fight. [^fischel-kahn-ltd-v-van-straaten-gallery-inc-189][^miller-v-superior-court-hession-111-cal-app-3d-3][^pappas-v-holloway-114-wash-2d-198-787-p-2d-30-19][^mcandrew-vuotto-new-jersey-decision-potentially] [^about]: By Steven Obiajulu, J.D. Published by [openagreements.org](https://openagreements.org). Last reviewed 2026-04-20. License: CC BY 4.0. Steven Obiajulu, J.D. edits this topic article for Federal + multi-state coverage. It synthesizes legal sources and is not legal advice. This article is for informational purposes only and does not create an attorney-client relationship. [^upjohn-co-v-united-states-449-u-s-383-1981]: **Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)** — "full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients" *Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).* [^commodity-futures-trading-comm-n-v-weintraub-471]: **Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985)** — "the authority to assert and waive the corporation's attorney-client privilege passes as well" *Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343 (1985).* [^sage-realty-corp-v-proskauer-rose-goetz-mendelso]: **Sage Realty Corp. v. Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn LLP, 91 N.Y.2d 30 (1997)** — "for the creation of which they paid" *Sage Realty Corp. v. Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn LLP, 91 N.Y.2d 30 (1997).* [^aba-formal-opinion-471-ethical-obligations-of-la]: **ABA Formal Opinion 471, Ethical Obligations of Lawyer to Surrender Papers and Property to which Former Client is Entitled** — "Upon the termination of a representation, a lawyer is required under Model Rules 1.15 and 1.16(d) to take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interest, and such steps include surrendering to the former client papers and property to which the former client is entitled." *ABA Formal Opinion 471, Ethical Obligations of Lawyer to Surrender Papers and Property to which Former Client is Entitled.* [^aba-formal-opinion-489-obligations-related-to-no]: **ABA Formal Opinion 489, Obligations Related to Notice When Lawyers Change Firms** — "Firm notification requirements, however, cannot be so rigid that they restrict or interfere with a client’s choice of counsel or the client’s choice of when to transition a matter." *ABA Formal Opinion 489, Obligations Related to Notice When Lawyers Change Firms.* [^new-york-state-bar-association-ethics-opinion-12]: **New York State Bar Association Ethics Opinion 1212** — "Absent the client’s informed consent, a public defender may not deliver open or closed client files to the assigned counsel program." *New York State Bar Association Ethics Opinion 1212.* [^tekni-plex-inc-v-meyner-landis-89-n-y-2d-123-199]: **Tekni-Plex, Inc. v. Meyner & Landis, 89 N.Y.2d 123 (1996)** — "When ownership of a corporation changes hands, whether the attorney-client relationship transfers as well to the new owners turns on the practical consequences rather than the formalities of the particular transaction." *Tekni-Plex, Inc. v. Meyner & Landis, 89 N.Y.2d 123 (1996).* [^federal-rule-of-evidence-502-b]: **Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b)** — "reasonable steps to prevent disclosure" *Federal Rule of Evidence 502(b).* [^victor-stanley-inc-v-creative-pipe-inc-250-f-r-d]: **Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251 (D. Md. 2008)** — "The intermediate test requires the court to balance the following factors to determine whether inadvertent production of attorney-client privileged materials waives the privilege: (1) the reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure; (2) the number of inadvertent disclosures; (3) the extent of the disclosures; (4) any delay in measures taken to rectify the disclosure; and (5) overriding interests in justice." *Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 251 (D. Md. 2008).* [^united-states-v-kovel-296-f-2d-918-2d-cir-1961]: **United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961)** — "What is vital to the privilege is that the communication be made in confidence for the purpose of obtaining legal advice from the lawyer." *United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).* [^cavallaro-v-united-states-284-f-3d-236-1st-cir-2]: **Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236 (1st Cir. 2002)** — "Kovel requires that to sustain a privilege an accountant must be ‘necessary, or at least highly useful, for the effective consultation between the client and the lawyer which the privilege is designed to permit.’" *Cavallaro v. United States, 284 F.3d 236 (1st Cir. 2002).* [^united-states-v-massachusetts-institute-of-techn]: **United States v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 129 F.3d 681 (1st Cir...** — "the general principle that disclosure normally negates the privilege is worth maintaining." *United States v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 129 F.3d 681 (1st Cir. 1997).* [^new-york-state-bar-association-ethics-opinion-71]: **New York State Bar Association Ethics Opinion 716** — "A lawyer representing an insured may not submit legal bills to an independent audit company employed by the insurance carrier without the consent of the insured after full disclosure." *New York State Bar Association Ethics Opinion 716.* [^perkins-coie-heppner-and-gilbarco-courts-apply-p]: **Perkins Coie commentary** — "The decisions show courts beginning to apply the law of attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine to generative AI and, thus far, viewing the tasks and their outcomes as neither expanding nor contracting the protections long recognized under existing frameworks." *Perkins Coie, Heppner and Gilbarco: Courts Apply Privilege and Work Product Protection to Generative AI Tools.* [^sidley-austin-generative-ai-and-privilege-practi]: **Sidley Austin commentary** — "Yet neither decision announced a shift in privilege law. Each applied existing principles to new factual settings." *Sidley Austin, Generative AI and Privilege: Practical Lessons from Two Early Decisions and What Comes Next.* [^blank-rome-ai-privilege-and-work-product-conflic]: **Blank Rome commentary** — "Two recent federal court decisions—issued one week apart—reach sharply divergent conclusions on whether materials generated using artificial intelligence (‘AI’) platforms are protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine." *Blank Rome, AI, Privilege, and Work Product: Conflicting Federal Decisions Create a New Risk Frontier.* [^proskauer-rose-recent-federal-privilege-ruling-r]: **Proskauer Rose commentary** — "disclosure of privileged communications to a third party in circumstances that undermine confidentiality (here, the corporation operating the AI tool) may result in waiver." *Proskauer Rose, Recent Federal Privilege Ruling Related to AI Tools Has Implications for Routine Tax Advisor Arrangements.* [^gibson-dunn-ai-privilege-waivers-sdny-rules-agai]: **Gibson Dunn, AI Privilege Waivers: SDNY Rules Against Privilege Protection for Consumer AI Outputs** — "Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the Southern District of New York, in an oral ruling from the bench, held that materials generated through a consumer AI tool at the prompting of a criminal defendant were not protected by either the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine." *Gibson Dunn, AI Privilege Waivers: SDNY Rules Against Privilege Protection for Consumer AI Outputs.* [^aba-formal-opinion-512-generative-artificial-int]: **ABA Formal Opinion 512, Generative Artificial Intelligence Tools** — "To ensure clients are protected, lawyers using generative artificial intelligence tools must fully consider their applicable ethical obligations, including their duties to provide competent legal representation, to protect client information, to communicate with clients, to supervise their employees and agents, to advance only meritorious claims and contentions, to ensure candor toward the tribunal, and to charge reasonable fees." *ABA Formal Opinion 512, Generative Artificial Intelligence Tools.* [^openai-enterprise-privacy]: **OpenAI, Enterprise privacy** — "We do not train our models on your data by default" *OpenAI, Enterprise privacy.* [^openai-help-center-managing-data-sharing-and-pri]: **OpenAI Help Center, Managing data, sharing, and privacy in ChatGPT Business** — "OpenAI won't train on your workspace's data." *OpenAI Help Center, Managing data, sharing, and privacy in ChatGPT Business.* [^microsoft-copilot-chat-privacy-and-protections]: **Microsoft, Copilot Chat Privacy and Protections** — "Microsoft 365 Copilot Chat prompts and responses are processed within the Microsoft 365 service boundary, which offers enterprise data protection." *Microsoft, Copilot Chat Privacy and Protections.* [^microsoft-enterprise-data-protection-in-microsof]: **Microsoft, Enterprise data protection in Microsoft 365 Copilot and Microsoft 365 Copilot Chat** — "The use of Microsoft 365 Copilot and Microsoft 365 Copilot Chat, as used by organizations, is covered by the terms of the Microsoft Products and Services Data Protection Addendum (DPA) and Microsoft Product Terms, with Microsoft acting as a data processor." *Microsoft, Enterprise data protection in Microsoft 365 Copilot and Microsoft 365 Copilot Chat.* [^warner-v-gilbarco-inc-et-al-case-no-2-24-cv-1233]: **Warner v. Gilbarco Inc. et al., Case No. 2:24-cv-12333 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 10, 2...** — "ChatGPT (and other generative AI programs) are tools, not persons" *Warner v. Gilbarco Inc. et al., Case No. 2:24-cv-12333 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 10, 2026).* [^upjohn-co-v-united-states-449-u-s-383-1981-2]: **Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981)** — "full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients" *Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).* [^hickman-v-taylor-329-u-s-495-1947]: **Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947)** — "the protective cloak of this privilege does not extend to information which an attorney secures from a witness while acting for his client in anticipation of litigation." *Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).* [^new-york-state-bar-association-ethics-opinion-71-2]: **New York State Bar Association Ethics Opinion 716** — "A lawyer representing an insured may not submit legal bills to an independent audit company employed by the insurance carrier without the consent of the insured after full disclosure." *New York State Bar Association Ethics Opinion 716.* [^hickman-v-taylor-329-u-s-495-1947-2]: **Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947)** — "the protective cloak of this privilege does not extend to information which an attorney secures from a witness while acting for his client in anticipation of litigation." *Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).* [^fischel-kahn-ltd-v-van-straaten-gallery-inc-189]: **Fischel & Kahn, Ltd. v. Van Straaten Gallery, Inc., 189 Ill. 2d 579 (2000)** — "we hold that van Straaten has not waived the attorney-client privilege in this case with respect to Pope & John by filing a malpractice action seeking attorney fees and settlement costs of the Mesirow litigation." *Fischel & Kahn, Ltd. v. Van Straaten Gallery, Inc., 189 Ill. 2d 579 (2000).* [^miller-v-superior-court-hession-111-cal-app-3d-3]: **Miller v. Superior Court (Hession), 111 Cal. App. 3d 390 (1980)** — "We reaffirm our holding in Lohman v. Superior Court (1978) 81 Cal. App. 3d 90 [146 Cal. Rptr. 171], that the attorney-client privilege is not waived by plaintiff in this situation placing in issue the content of a confidential communication." *Miller v. Superior Court (Hession), 111 Cal. App. 3d 390 (1980).* [^pappas-v-holloway-114-wash-2d-198-787-p-2d-30-19]: **Pappas v. Holloway, 114 Wash. 2d 198, 787 P.2d 30 (1990)** — "In this instance, the Holloways cannot counterclaim against Pappas for malpractice and at the same time conceal from him communications which have a direct bearing on this issue simply because the attorney-client privilege protects them." *Pappas v. Holloway, 114 Wash. 2d 198, 787 P.2d 30 (1990).* [^mcguirewoods-clients-suing-their-lawyers-for-mal]: **McGuireWoods commentary** — "Clients and lawyers asserting claims against each other can waive privilege protection without disclosing any privileged communications." *McGuireWoods, Clients Suing Their Lawyers For Malpractice Risk A Waiver Of Communications With Successor Counsel.* [^hinshaw-culbertson-plaintiff-s-malpractice-suit]: **Hinshaw & Culbertson commentary** — "the former client’s legal malpractice action against prior counsel placed its otherwise protected communications with subsequent counsel ‘at issue’ and that the former client thus waived any privilege." *Hinshaw & Culbertson, Plaintiff's Malpractice Suit Placed Attorney-Client Communications With Subsequent Counsel 'At Issue' and Plaintiff Thus Waived Privilege.* [^mcandrew-vuotto-new-jersey-decision-potentially]: **McAndrew Vuotto commentary** — "The Appellate Division, citing In re Kozlov, 79 N.J. 232, 242-43 (1979), detailed the three requirements for piercing the attorney-client privilege" *McAndrew Vuotto, New Jersey Decision Potentially Creates Complexity in Attorney-Client Privilege and Legal Malpractice Contribution Law.*