50-State Law Survey
Employee Invention-Assignment Laws by State
A side-by-side comparison by state of how each US state limits the enforceable scope of an employee invention-assignment agreement — whether a §2870-style statute carves out an employee's own-time inventions, whether the employee must be notified, who owns an invention absent a written assignment, and how far a post-employment "holdover" clause can reach. Each row links to the full practice guide for that jurisdiction. This is legal research, not legal advice.
| Jurisdiction | Own-time invention carve-out? | Bottom line | Main law or case | Last reviewed | Details |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alabama | No statute (common law) | Alabama has no employee-invention-assignment statute, so an assignment clause is bounded only by ordinary contract law, the common-law default rules, and the federal patent and copyright overlay — not a California-style own-time carve-out or notice requirement; absent a written assignment the inventor owns unless hired to invent under the federal baseline (no Alabama appellate decision found in our review addresses the default), the Supreme Court of Alabama has treated a broad contractual invention-ownership clause as operative, and the enforceability of a post-employment holdover clause is unsettled — the Restrictive Covenant Act voids restraints of a lawful profession outside its exceptions, but no Alabama authority found in our review applies it to a trailing invention assignment. | No Alabama invention-assignment statute; Gilley v. Southern Research Institute, 176 So. 3d 1214 (Ala. 2015); Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011); Ala. Code § 8-1-190 | ||
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| Alaska | No statute (common law) | Alaska has no employee-invention-assignment statute — the one legislative attempt, 2022 Senate Bill 232, died in committee — so an assignment clause is bounded only by ordinary contract law, the common-law default rules, and the federal patent and copyright overlay, with no own-time carve-out and no notice requirement; absent a written assignment the inventor owns unless hired to invent, no Alaska decision found in our review addresses employee-invention ownership or a trailing clause, and a holdover clause would most likely be tested by analogy under Alaska's restrictive-covenant line, where courts reform overbroad restraints drafted in good faith but refuse to alter willful overreach. | No Alaska invention-assignment statute; Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011); Data Mgmt., Inc. v. Greene, 757 P.2d 62 (Alaska 1988) | ||
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| American Samoa | No statute (common law) | American Samoa has no employee-invention-assignment statute and no local invention case law found in our review — the only invention-ownership provisions anywhere in its law are pro-government contract-specialist regulations — so every invention-specific rule here is a prediction anchored in A.S.C.A. § 1.0201, which imports the common law of England as suitable to local conditions and which the High Court reads as U.S.-modified common law ordinarily taken from the Restatements; that imported default leaves the invention with the employee-inventor (hired-to-invent exception, employer shop right), matching the federal patent baseline that applies of its own force, and a post-employment holdover clause is unsettled, with imported reasonableness the predicted test. | No American Samoa invention-assignment statute; A.S.C.A. § 1.0201 (imported common law); Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011) | ||
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| Arizona | No statute (common law) | Arizona has no employee-invention-assignment statute — the section sometimes cited for one (A.R.S. § 44-403) is the damages provision of the state trade-secrets act, and the 2013 bill that would have created a carve-out died without enactment — so an assignment clause is bounded only by ordinary contract law, the common-law default rules, and the federal patent and copyright overlay; absent a written assignment the inventor owns unless hired to invent, and the enforceability of a post-employment holdover clause is unsettled, with Arizona's restrictive-covenant reasonableness framework — blue-pencil severance only, no rewriting — the likely but untested measure. | No Arizona invention-assignment statute; San Manuel Copper Corp. v. Redmond, 8 Ariz. App. 214 (1968); Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011) | ||
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| Arkansas | No statute (common law) | Arkansas has no employee-invention-assignment statute, so an assignment clause is bounded only by ordinary contract law, the common-law default rules, and the federal patent and copyright overlay — not a California-style own-time carve-out or notice requirement; absent a written assignment the inventor owns under the federal inventor-first baseline (no Arkansas appellate decision on employee-invention ownership found in our review), and the enforceability of a post-employment holdover clause is unsettled because Ark. Code Ann. § 4-75-101 governs only covenants not to compete and expressly excludes employment terms that do not concern competition, leaving recharacterization as a restraint of trade the only untested path to a limit. | No Arkansas invention-assignment statute; Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011); McElmurry v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 995 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1993) | ||
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| California | Statutory carve-out | A California employer may require assignment of inventions tied to its business or to the employee's work, but Section 2870 voids forced assignment of true own-time, own-resource inventions, the employer must give written notice under Section 2872, and overbroad holdover clauses are void under Section 16600. | Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2870–2872; Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16600 | ||
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| Colorado | No statute (common law) | Colorado has no employee-invention-assignment statute, so there is no own-time carve-out and no notice requirement — an assignment clause is bounded by ordinary contract law, the common-law inventor-owns default (with the hired-to-invent exception and the employer's shop right), and the federal patent overlay; a post-employment holdover clause would most likely be tested under Colorado's well-settled reasonableness rule for covenants not to compete, layered since August 10, 2022 with C.R.S. § 8-2-113's void-unless-excepted regime for such covenants, although no Colorado decision found in our review has applied § 8-2-113 to a holdover invention-assignment clause specifically. | No Colorado invention-assignment statute; Hewett v. Samsonite Corp., 507 P.2d 1119 (Colo. App. 1973); C.R.S. § 8-2-113 | ||
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| Connecticut | No statute (common law) | Connecticut has no employee-invention-assignment statute — the only Connecticut invention statutes reach state employees and public-university employees — so a private-sector assignment clause is bounded by ordinary contract law, the common-law inventor-first default, and restrictive-covenant reasonableness; the Connecticut Supreme Court has said the employer cannot claim an employee's patented invention absent a contract unless a recognized exception applies, and a 1944 trial-level Connecticut decision upheld a two-year trailing disclose-and-assign clause as reasonable, so trailing clauses face a reasonableness test rather than any fixed statutory cap. | No Connecticut invention-assignment statute; Transparent Ruler Co. v. C-Thru Ruler Co., 129 Conn. 369 (1942); Murray v. A. F. Holden Co., 12 Conn. Supp. 419 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1944) | ||
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| Delaware | Statutory carve-out | Delaware's invention-assignment statute (19 Del. C. section 805) voids any clause forcing an employee to assign an invention developed entirely on their own time, without the employer's resources, that neither relates to the employer's business or R&D nor results from the employee's work; it imposes no notice requirement; and post-employment “holdover” clauses are enforceable only so far as reasonable. | 19 Del. C. section 805; Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011); Personalized User Model, LLP v. Google, Inc., 797 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2015) | ||
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| District of Columbia | No statute (common law) | The District of Columbia has no employee-invention-assignment statute, so an assignment clause is bounded by ordinary contract law, the common-law inventor-owns default, and the federal patent and copyright overlay — but the Ban on Non-Compete Agreements Act adds a layer most no-statute jurisdictions lack; its definition of a non-compete provision contains no invention-assignment exclusion, so whether a post-employment holdover clause is void under the Act (with at least $1,500 per employee in liability for attempted enforcement) or is instead tested under the Restatement reasonableness framework adopted in Ellis is unsettled, and absent a written assignment the inventor owns unless hired to invent. | No D.C. invention-assignment statute; D.C. Code § 32-581.01 et seq. (Ban on Non-Compete Agreements); Apprio, Inc. v. Zaccari, 104 F.4th 897 (D.C. Cir. 2024); Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011) | ||
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| Florida | No statute (common law) | Florida has no employee-invention-assignment statute, so there is no own-time carve-out and no notice requirement — an assignment clause is bounded by ordinary contract law, the common-law inventor-owns default (with the hired-to-invent exception and the employer's shop right), and the federal patent overlay; a post-employment holdover clause would most likely be tested under Fla. Stat. § 542.335's statutory reasonableness framework for post-term restrictive covenants, although no Florida decision found in our review has applied § 542.335 to a holdover invention-assignment clause specifically. | No Florida invention-assignment statute; State Bd. of Education of Fla. v. Bourne, 7 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1942); Fla. Stat. § 542.335 | ||
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| Georgia | No statute (common law) | Georgia has no employee-invention-assignment statute; the inventor owns by default under federal patent law, an assignment must use present-tense transfer language, and a post-employment "holdover" clause is policed as a restrictive covenant under the Georgia Restrictive Covenants Act. | No Georgia invention-assignment statute; Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Lieberam, 959 F.2d 901 (11th Cir. 1992); O.C.G.A. §§ 13-8-53, -57 | ||
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| Guam | Unsettled | Guam has no employee-invention-assignment statute in the California mold — no own-time carve-out and no notice requirement — but two never-construed Field Code provisions pull in opposite directions, with 18 GCA § 55311 declaring that everything an employee acquires by virtue of employment belongs to the employer and 19 GCA § 31301 giving the author of any product of the mind, expressly including an invention, exclusive ownership; no Guam invention decision was found in our review, so default ownership is a prediction that runs through Guam's borrowed-statute rule — California case law construing the identical parent statutes is persuasive — and points to the employee, and a post-employment holdover clause that operates as a restraint faces outright voidness under 18 GCA § 88105, the verbatim twin of California's section 16600 that the Supreme Court of Guam read as a per-se ban in Island Eye Center v. Lombard. | 18 GCA §§ 55311, 88105; 19 GCA § 31301; Island Eye Ctr., Inc. v. Lombard, 2020 Guam 32 | ||
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| Hawaii | No statute (common law) | Hawaii has no employee-invention-assignment statute — the one California-style carve-out bill (HB 2911, 2008) died without passage — so an assignment clause is bounded by ordinary contract law and the federal inventor-first baseline, and absent a written assignment the inventor owns unless hired to invent; a post-employment holdover clause is unsettled, but unlike most no-statute states Hawaii supplies a statutory restraint-of-trade framework (the HRS § 480-4 illegality default, ancillarity requirement, and rule-of-reason review, and a 2015 voidness rule for technology-business noncompete and nonsolicit clauses that a holdover clause is not facially within), plus a one-way prevailing-employee fee shift. | No Hawaii invention-assignment statute; HRS § 480-4 restraint-of-trade framework; Prudential Locations, LLC v. Gagnon, 150 Haw. 470, 506 P.3d 134 (2022); Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011) | ||
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| Idaho | No statute (common law) | Idaho has no employee-invention-assignment statute, so an assignment clause is bounded only by ordinary contract law, the common-law default rules, and the federal patent and copyright overlay — not a California-style own-time carve-out or notice requirement; absent express terms the inventor owns (Idaho's own Supreme Court held that an employee is entitled to the fruits of his own ingenuity), and the enforceability of a post-employment holdover clause is unsettled because Idaho Code ch. 44-27 is textually scoped to restraints on direct competition and no Idaho decision found in our review addresses a trailing assignment. | No Idaho invention-assignment statute; Holders Manufacturers, Inc. v. Cudd, 80 Idaho 557, 335 P.2d 890 (1959); Idaho Code §§ 44-2701 to 44-2704; Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011) | ||
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| Illinois | Statutory carve-out | Illinois's Employee Patent Act (765 ILCS 1060/2) voids any clause forcing an employee to assign an invention developed entirely on their own time, without the employer's resources, that neither relates to the employer's business or R&D nor results from the employee's work; the employer must give written notice of that carve-out; and post-employment "holdover" clauses are enforceable only so far as reasonable. | 765 ILCS 1060/2 (Employee Patent Act); Guth v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 72 F.2d 385 (7th Cir. 1934); Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011) | ||
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| Indiana | No statute (common law) | Indiana has no employee-invention-assignment statute, so an assignment clause is bounded only by ordinary contract law — construed strictly against the employer — the common-law default rules, and the federal patent overlay, not a California-style own-time carve-out or notice requirement; absent an express assignment the inventor owns and the employer holds at most a shop right under Michels v. Dyna-Kote, and no Indiana decision found in our review addresses a post-employment holdover clause, which would most likely be judged by analogy under the reasonableness limits Indiana applies to employment restraints of trade. | No Indiana invention-assignment statute; Michels v. Dyna-Kote Industries, Inc., 497 N.E.2d 586 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); Central Indiana Podiatry, P.C. v. Krueger, 882 N.E.2d 723 (Ind. 2008) | ||
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| Iowa | No statute (common law) | Iowa has no employee-invention-assignment statute, so an assignment clause is bounded only by ordinary contract law, the common-law inventor-owns default, and the reasonableness limits Iowa applies to restraints arising from employment — not a California-style own-time carve-out or notice requirement; absent a written assignment the inventor owns unless hired to invent, and the Iowa Supreme Court tests invention-assignment provisions under its restrictive-covenant reasonableness standard, though no Iowa decision found in our review adjudicates a clause assigning inventions first conceived after employment ends. | No Iowa invention-assignment statute; Bandag, Inc. v. Morenings, 146 N.W.2d 916 (Iowa 1966); Revere Transducers, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 595 N.W.2d 751 (Iowa 1999) | ||
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| Kansas | Statutory carve-out | Kansas's invention-assignment statute (K.S.A. 44-130) voids any clause forcing an employee to assign an invention developed entirely on their own time, without the employer's resources, that neither relates to the employer's business or R&D nor results from the employee's work; the employer must give written notice of that carve-out; and post-employment "holdover" clauses are enforceable only so far as reasonable. | K.S.A. 44-130; Farmers Edge Inc. v. Farmobile, LLC, 970 F.3d 1027 (8th Cir. 2020); Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011) | ||
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| Kentucky | No statute (common law) | Kentucky has no employee-invention-assignment statute, so an assignment clause is bounded only by ordinary contract law, the common-law default rules, and the federal patent and copyright overlay — not a California-style own-time carve-out or notice requirement; absent a written assignment the inventor owns unless hired to invent, with the employer holding at most a shop right to use the invention without royalties under the Dorton cases, and the enforceability of a post-employment holdover clause is unsettled — no Kentucky authority found in our review, and the one in-state federal holdover case applied North Carolina law by party agreement. | No Kentucky invention-assignment statute; Dorton v. Ashland Oil & Refining Co., 197 S.W.2d 274 (Ky. 1946); Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011) | ||
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| Louisiana | No statute (common law) | Louisiana — a civil-law jurisdiction — has no employee-invention-assignment statute, so an assignment clause is an ordinary Civil Code contract bounded by the federal patent overlay rather than a California-style own-time carve-out or notice requirement; absent a written assignment the federal inventor-first default leaves ownership with the employee, Louisiana case law takes invention-assignment provisions tethered to the employment outside the restraint-of-trade statute, and the enforceability of a true post-termination holdover clause is unsettled because no Louisiana court has decided one. | No Louisiana invention-assignment statute; NovelAire Technologies, L.L.C. v. Harrison, 50 So. 3d 913 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2010); La. R.S. 23:921; Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011) | ||
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| Maine | No statute (common law) | Maine has no employee-invention-assignment statute, so an assignment clause is bounded only by ordinary contract law, the federal inventor-first baseline, and Maine's restrictive-covenant reasonableness line; the 2019 noncompete statute (26 M.R.S. § 599-A) attaches its notice, ban, and delayed-effectiveness rules only to contracts that prohibit working, not to ownership-allocating assignment clauses; absent a written assignment the inventor owns unless hired to invent; and a trailing clause would be judged under the covenant-reasonableness framework the Law Court has applied beyond noncompetes while favorably citing the leading holdover case. | No Maine invention-assignment statute; 26 M.R.S. § 599-A (noncompetes only); Bernier v. Merrill Air Engineers, 2001 ME 17, 770 A.2d 97; Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011) | ||
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| Maryland | No statute (common law) | Maryland has no employee-invention-assignment statute — a 2020 bill that would have created a California-style carve-out died in committee — so an assignment clause is bounded only by ordinary contract law, the common-law default rules, and the federal patent and copyright overlay, with no own-time carve-out or notice requirement; absent a written assignment the inventor owns unless hired to invent, a rule the federal courts sitting in Maryland have applied directly, and a post-employment holdover clause would most likely be tested under Maryland's restrictive-covenant reasonableness rule by analogy — no decision found in our review addresses a trailing invention-assignment clause. | No Maryland invention-assignment statute; Houghton v. United States, 23 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1928); MacIntosh v. Brunswick Corp., 241 Md. 24 (1965); Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011) | ||
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| Massachusetts | No statute (common law) | Massachusetts has no employee-invention-assignment statute — and its Noncompetition Agreement Act expressly excludes invention-assignment agreements — so the inventor owns by default under SJC common law, and a post-employment "holdover" clause is enforceable only so far as it is reasonable. | No Massachusetts invention-assignment statute; G.L. c. 149, § 24L; National Development Co. v. Gray, 316 Mass. 240 (1944) | ||
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| Michigan | No statute (common law) | Michigan has no employee-invention-assignment statute, so an assignment clause is bounded only by ordinary contract law, the common-law inventor-owns default, and Michigan reasonableness limits on restraints of trade — not a California-style own-time carve-out or notice requirement; absent a written assignment the inventor-employee owns and the employer gets at most a shop right unless the employee was hired to invent, and a post-employment holdover clause is tested only for reasonableness — a federal court applying Michigan law held an indefinite trailing-assignment clause invalid as an unreasonable restraint of trade, though no Michigan state appellate decision found in our review is squarely on point. | No Michigan invention-assignment statute; A & C Engineering Co. v. Atherholt, 355 Mich. 677 (1959); Federal Screw Works v. Interface Systems, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 1562 (E.D. Mich. 1983); Mich. Comp. Laws § 445.774a | ||
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| Minnesota | Statutory carve-out | Minnesota Statutes section 181.78 voids any clause forcing an employee to assign an invention developed entirely on their own time, without the employer's resources, that neither relates directly to the employer's business or R&D nor results from the employee's work; the employer must give written notice of that carve-out; and post-employment "holdover" clauses are enforceable only so far as reasonable — and now risk being void as covenants not to compete under section 181.988. | Minn. Stat. § 181.78; Minn. Stat. § 181.988 (2023 non-compete ban); Eaton Corp. v. Giere, 971 F.2d 136 (8th Cir. 1992); Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011) | ||
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| Mississippi | No statute (common law) | Mississippi has no employee-invention-assignment statute and no Mississippi appellate decision found in our review construes such a clause on the merits, so an assignment clause is bounded only by ordinary contract law, the common-law default rules, and the federal patent and copyright overlay — not a California-style own-time carve-out or notice requirement; absent a written assignment the inventor owns unless hired to invent, and the enforceability of a post-employment holdover clause is unsettled — no Mississippi authority found in our review, no restrictive-covenant statute exists to reach it, and even the covenant-reasonableness analogy from Redd Pest Control v. Heatherly is untested for invention holdovers. | No Mississippi invention-assignment statute; American Elec. v. Singarayar, 530 So. 2d 1319 (Miss. 1988) (interlocutory only); Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011) | ||
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| Missouri | No statute (common law) | Missouri has no employee-invention-assignment statute — the only invention statutes in RSMo Chapter 417 regulate invention-developer services sold to consumers and trade secrets — so an assignment clause is bounded only by ordinary contract law, the common-law inventor-owns default, and the federal patent and copyright overlay. Absent a written assignment the employee owns the invention, with at most an equitable shop right (a non-exclusive license, not ownership) in the employer, and no Missouri appellate decision found in our review squarely adjudicates a trailing-assignment clause, so a holdover clause would most likely be tested by analogy under Missouri's general reasonableness limits on restraints arising from employment. | No Missouri invention-assignment statute; Dewey v. American Stair Glide Corp., 557 S.W.2d 643 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Corrigan v. Armstrong, Teasdale, 824 S.W.2d 92 (Mo. Ct. App. E.D. 1992) | ||
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| Montana | Unsettled | Montana has no employee-invention-assignment statute in the California mold — no own-time carve-out and no notice requirement — but MCA 39-2-102, an 1895 Field Civil Code provision, declares that everything an employee acquires by virtue of employment belongs to the employer, and no Montana court has decided whether that text reaches inventions; in Associated Mgmt. Servs. v. Ruff the Montana Supreme Court treated the employment relationship as primarily contractual without automatic employer ownership, so who owns an invention absent a written assignment is genuinely unclear between the statute's employer-favoring text and the federal inventor-first baseline, and a post-employment holdover clause would most likely be tested under the restraint-of-trade framework of MCA 28-2-703. | Mont. Code Ann. §§ 39-2-102, 28-2-703; Associated Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Ruff, 2018 MT 182 | ||
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| Nebraska | No statute (common law) | Nebraska has no employee-invention-assignment statute — its only invention statutes are consumer-protection laws — so an assignment clause is bounded only by ordinary contract law, the common-law default rules, and the federal patent and copyright overlay, not a California-style own-time carve-out or notice requirement; absent a written assignment the inventor owns unless hired to invent, the Nebraska Supreme Court has given an employer only an implied royalty-free license in an invention developed with its materials, and a post-employment holdover clause is unsettled — with the added hazard that Nebraska courts never reform an overbroad covenant, so an overbroad clause is struck entirely rather than trimmed. | No Nebraska invention-assignment statute; Farmers Edge Inc. v. Farmobile, LLC, 970 F.3d 1027 (8th Cir. 2020) (applying Nebraska law); Hutton v. City of Omaha, 111 Neb. 850 (1924); Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011) | ||
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| Nevada | Employer owns by statute | Nevada is a national outlier — NRS 600.500 makes the employer, not the employee, the default owner of any patentable invention or trade secret an employee develops in the course and scope of employment that relates to the work, with no employee carve-out and no notice requirement; a written present-assignment clause is still needed for clean federal patent title, and post-employment "holdover" clauses are policed under Nevada's restrictive-covenant statute, NRS 613.195. | Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 600.500, 613.195; Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011) | ||
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| New Hampshire | No statute (common law) | New Hampshire has no employee-invention-assignment statute, so an assignment clause is bounded only by ordinary contract law, the common-law default rules, and the federal patent and copyright overlay — not a California-style own-time carve-out or notice requirement; RSA 275:70 requires pre-hire disclosure of noncompete agreements but expressly preserves intellectual-property-assignment provisions. Absent a written assignment the inventor owns unless hired to invent under Vigitron, Inc. v. Ferguson, and with no on-point holdover decision found in our review, a trailing-assignment clause would most likely be judged under New Hampshire's general three-prong reasonableness test for restraints on employment. | No New Hampshire invention-assignment statute; Vigitron, Inc. v. Ferguson, 120 N.H. 626, 419 A.2d 1115 (1980); N.H. RSA 275:70 | ||
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| New Jersey | Statutory carve-out | New Jersey's invention-assignment statute (N.J.S.A. 34:1B-265, effective April 1, 2018) voids any clause forcing an employee to assign an invention developed entirely on their own time, without the employer's resources, that neither relates to the employer's business or R&D nor results from the employee's work; it imposes no notice requirement; and post-employment "holdover" clauses are enforceable only so far as reasonable under Ingersoll-Rand v. Ciavatta. | N.J.S.A. 34:1B-265; Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Ciavatta, 110 N.J. 609 (1988); Kinkade v. New York Shipbuilding Corp., 21 N.J. 362 (1956) | ||
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| New Mexico | No statute (common law) | New Mexico has no employee-invention-assignment statute, so an assignment clause is bounded only by ordinary contract law, the common-law default rules, and the federal patent and copyright overlay — not a California-style own-time carve-out or notice requirement; absent a written assignment the inventor owns unless hired to invent, the Federal Circuit applying New Mexico law has held that state contract law governs transfers of patent rights, and the enforceability of a post-employment holdover clause is unsettled and would be judged under New Mexico's general restraint-of-trade reasonableness. | No New Mexico invention-assignment statute; Regents of the Univ. of N.M. v. Knight, 321 F.3d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011) | ||
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| New York | Statutory carve-out | New York's Labor Law § 203-f (effective September 15, 2023) voids any clause forcing an employee to assign a true own-time, own-resource invention unrelated to the employer's business, but unlike California it requires no employee notice; absent a written assignment the inventor owns by default under Cahill v. Regan, and post-employment holdover clauses are judged by ordinary restrictive-covenant reasonableness. | N.Y. Lab. Law § 203-f; Cahill v. Regan, 5 N.Y.2d 292 (1959) | ||
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| North Carolina | Statutory carve-out | North Carolina's invention-assignment statute (N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 66-57.1 and 66-57.2) voids any clause forcing an employee to assign an invention developed entirely on their own time, without the employer's resources, that neither relates to the employer's business or R&D nor results from the employee's work; it requires no notice; and it bars an employer from rescinding vested invention rights in a compensation dispute unless the written agreement provides otherwise or the employee proves the employer obtained title by fraud. | N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 66-57.1, 66-57.2; Speck v. North Carolina Dairy Foundation, Inc., 311 N.C. 679 (1984); Morris v. Scenera Research, LLC, 368 N.C. 857 (2016) | ||
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| North Dakota | Employer owns by statute | North Dakota is an employer-ownership outlier — N.D.C.C. § 34-02-11 makes everything an employee acquires by virtue of the employment belong to the employer, a default construed for patent ownership through the hired-to-invent lens in Keller v. Clark Equipment Co. (8th Cir. 1983) and adopted by the North Dakota Supreme Court in First American Bank West v. Berdahl (N.D. 1996); there is no own-time carve-out and no notice duty, and a post-employment holdover clause that operates as a restraint on a former employee faces outright voidness under N.D.C.C. § 9-08-06, which admits no reasonableness test and no judicial rewriting. | N.D. Cent. Code §§ 34-02-11, 9-08-06; Keller v. Clark Equipment Co., 715 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1983); First American Bank West v. Berdahl, 556 N.W.2d 63 (N.D. 1996) | ||
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| Northern Mariana Islands | No statute (common law) | The CNMI has no employee-invention-assignment statute and no local invention case law found in our review — every invention-specific rule here is a prediction, though an unusually well-anchored one, because 7 CMC § 3401 statutorily makes the common law as expressed in the Restatements the rule of decision; that reception rule imports the employee-inventor default (hired-to-invent exception, employer shop right), matching the federal patent baseline, and a post-employment holdover clause is unsettled, with Restatement reasonableness the predicted test. | No CNMI invention-assignment statute; 7 CMC § 3401 (Restatements as rules of decision); Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011) | ||
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| Ohio | No statute (common law) | Ohio has no employee-invention-assignment statute for private employment — its only employee-invention statutes vest ownership in state colleges and universities and in charter county hospitals — so an assignment clause is bounded only by ordinary contract law, the common-law default rules, and the federal patent and copyright overlay, not a California-style own-time carve-out or notice requirement; absent a written assignment the inventor owns unless hired to invent, with at most a shop right for the employer, and a post-employment holdover clause is tested only for reasonableness — a federal district court applying Ohio law voided a five-year holdover, but no Ohio state appellate decision found in our review has squarely ruled on such a clause. | No Ohio invention-assignment statute; Gemco Engineering & Mfg. Co. v. Henderson, 151 Ohio St. 95 (1949); Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 42 Ohio St.2d 21 (1975); GTI Corp. v. Calhoon, 309 F. Supp. 762 (S.D. Ohio 1969) | ||
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| Oklahoma | No statute (common law) | Oklahoma has no employee-invention-assignment statute in either direction — no §2870-style own-time carve-out and no employer-acquisition default; under Amoco Production Co. v. Lindley the employee's invention remains the employee's property absent an express or implied agreement, and an undefined contractual invention captures only patentable subject matter, with the hired-to-invent exception applied as Oklahoma implied-in-fact contract law in Skycam, LLC v. Bennett. A post-employment holdover clause that operates as a restraint faces the void-to-that-extent rule of 15 O.S. § 217 outside narrow statutory safe harbors, § 219A(B) voids conflicting employment-contract provisions, and Oklahoma courts refuse to sever the offending words rather than voiding the clause. | Okla. Stat. tit. 15, §§ 217, 219A; Amoco Production Co. v. Lindley, 1980 OK 6, 609 P.2d 733; Skycam, LLC v. Bennett, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (N.D. Okla. 2012) | ||
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| Oregon | No statute (common law) | Oregon has no employee-invention-assignment statute, so an assignment clause is bounded only by ordinary contract law, the common-law default rules, and the federal patent overlay — not a California-style own-time carve-out or notice requirement; absent a written assignment the inventor owns unless hired to invent, subject to the employer's shop right, and because assignment clauses fall outside Oregon's noncompete statute a post-employment holdover clause would be judged under Oregon's common-law reasonableness rule for partial restraints — the Oregon Court of Appeals has endorsed a reasonable-period tail only in dicta, and no Oregon decision found in our review has enforced or struck one on the merits. | No Oregon invention-assignment statute; Mainland Industries v. Timberland Machines, 58 Or. App. 585 (1982); White's Electronics v. Teknetics, 67 Or. App. 63 (1984); Eldridge v. Johnston, 195 Or. 379 (1952) | ||
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| Pennsylvania | No statute (common law) | Pennsylvania has no employee-invention-assignment statute, so an assignment clause is bounded by ordinary contract law, the common-law default rules, and a judge-made strict-construction canon rather than a California-style own-time carve-out or notice requirement; absent a written assignment the inventor owns unless hired to invent (the employer at most earns a shop right), Pennsylvania courts construe assignment agreements strictly and presume they do not reach future inventions without plain language, and no Pennsylvania authority found in our review has decided whether a post-employment holdover clause is enforceable. | No Pennsylvania invention-assignment statute; Aetna-Standard Eng'g Co. v. Rowland, 493 A.2d 1375 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); White Heat Products Co. v. Thomas, 109 A. 685 (Pa. 1920) | ||
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| Puerto Rico | No statute (common law) | Puerto Rico — a civil-law jurisdiction governed by the Civil Code of 2020 — has no private-sector employee-invention statute (the only employee-invention statute, 3 L.P.R.A. § 694a, covers Commonwealth research personnel), so an assignment clause is an ordinary Civil Code contract bounded by the federal patent overlay rather than a California-style own-time carve-out or notice requirement; absent a written assignment the federal inventor-first default leaves ownership with the employee — no Puerto Rico employee-invention decision was found in our review — and whether a post-employment holdover clause would face the strict Arthur Young non-compete doctrine (twelve-month ceiling, consideration beyond continued employment, writing, total nullity without judicial narrowing) or be treated as an ordinary title-allocation clause is unsettled. | No Puerto Rico private-sector invention-assignment statute; Arthur Young & Co. v. Vega III, 136 D.P.R. 157 (1994); Banks v. Unisys Corp., 228 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011) | ||
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| Rhode Island | No statute (common law) | Rhode Island has no employee-invention-assignment statute — no own-time carve-out and no notice requirement — and R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-59-2(8)(vii) expressly excludes invention assignment agreements from the state's noncompete ban, a shield for the clause rather than a limit on it; absent a written assignment the inventor owns unless hired to invent, and a trailing clause is tested for reasonableness on the strength of Universal Winding Co. v. Clarke, a 1952 federal decision applying Rhode Island law that upheld a one-year, subject-matter-limited holdover — no Rhode Island state appellate court has ruled on a holdover clause in our review. | No Rhode Island invention-assignment statute; R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-59-2(8)(vii) (invention assignments excluded from the noncompete ban); Universal Winding Co. v. Clarke, 108 F. Supp. 329 (D. Conn. 1952) (applying Rhode Island law); Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011) | ||
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| South Carolina | No statute (common law) | South Carolina has no employee-invention-assignment statute, but it is one of the few states with a direct holding on trailing clauses — in Milliken & Co. v. Morin the South Carolina Supreme Court held invention-assignment and confidentiality clauses are not restraints of trade and are not strictly construed in favor of the employee, and it upheld a one-year post-employment holdover clause as eminently reasonable; absent a written assignment the inventor owns unless hired to invent, and a clause broad enough to function as a noncompete falls back into the strict common-law covenant regime, where courts refuse to blue-pencil. | No South Carolina invention-assignment statute; Milliken & Co. v. Morin, 399 S.C. 23, 731 S.E.2d 288 (S.C. 2012); Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011) | ||
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| South Dakota | No statute (common law) | South Dakota has no invention-assignment carve-out statute, and although SDCL § 60-2-10 gives the employer whatever an employee acquires by virtue of employment, the South Dakota Supreme Court in Dier refused to read it as an employer-ownership invention statute — absent an express or implied agreement the inventor owns an own-time invention; no notice regime exists; a post-employment holdover clause would face reasonableness-and-severability scrutiny under Rezatto if narrow and trade-secret-tethered, but risks being void under SDCL § 53-9-8 if it functions as a de facto noncompete. | SDCL § 60-2-10; Rural Pennington County Tax Ass'n v. Dier, 515 N.W.2d 841 (S.D. 1994); SDCL § 53-9-8 | ||
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| Tennessee | No statute (common law) | Tennessee has no employee-invention-assignment statute, so an assignment clause is bounded only by ordinary contract law, the common-law default rules, and the federal patent and copyright overlay — not a California-style own-time carve-out or notice requirement; absent a written assignment the inventor owns unless hired to invent, Tennessee courts enforce written assignment clauses as contracts, and a post-employment holdover clause — on which no Tennessee case was found in our review — would most likely be tested by analogy under Tennessee's restrictive-covenant reasonableness doctrine, against the backdrop of the 2026 noncompete statute (T.C.A. §§ 50-1-210 and 50-1-211, effective July 1, 2026), which is silent on invention assignment. | No Tennessee invention-assignment statute; Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011); Hasty v. Rent-A-Driver, Inc., 671 S.W.2d 471 (Tenn. 1984) | ||
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| Texas | No statute (common law) | Texas has no employee-invention-assignment statute; the inventor owns by default under federal patent law, so a Texas employer must rely on precise present-tense assignment language, and a post-employment "holdover" clause is policed only as a restraint of trade under Texas reasonableness law. | No Texas invention-assignment statute; Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011); United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933); Tex. Bus. & Com. Code § 15.50 | ||
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| U.S. Virgin Islands | No statute (common law) | The U.S. Virgin Islands has no employee-invention-assignment statute, so an assignment clause is bounded only by ordinary contract law, the federal patent and copyright overlay, and the common-law rules a Virgin Islands court would select under the Banks three-factor methodology — not a California-style own-time carve-out or notice requirement; no Virgin Islands decision on employee-invention ownership was found in our review, so the inventor-owns default with hired-to-invent and shop-right exceptions is a prediction rather than settled local doctrine, and the enforceability of a post-employment holdover clause is unsettled, with only trial-level restrictive-covenant reasonableness law available by analogy. | No V.I. invention-assignment statute found in our review; Banks v. International Rental & Leasing Corp., 55 V.I. 967 (V.I. 2011); Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011) | ||
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| Utah | Statutory carve-out | Utah's Employment Inventions Act (Utah Code sections 34-39-2 and 34-39-3) makes an assignment or license clause unenforceable only for an invention the employee created entirely on their own time that is not an "employment invention" — but that term is defined so broadly, reaching anything related to the employer's industry or anticipated R&D, that the own-time carve-out is materially narrower than the California model; the Act requires no employee notice, and post-employment "holdover" clauses are enforceable only so far as reasonable. | Utah Code sections 34-39-2, 34-39-3 (Employment Inventions Act); Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011); Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623 (Utah 1982) | ||
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| Vermont | No statute (common law) | Vermont has no employee-invention-assignment statute — a California-style carve-out bill (S.113) died in committee in 2013 — so an assignment clause is bounded only by ordinary contract law, the common-law default rules, and the federal patent and copyright overlay, not an own-time carve-out or notice requirement; absent a written assignment the inventor owns unless hired to invent, and the enforceability of a post-employment holdover clause is unsettled — no Vermont decision found in our review addresses one, and a court would most likely test it under the covenant-reasonableness line running from Vermont Electric Supply v. Andrus through Systems and Software v. Barnes. | No Vermont invention-assignment statute; Vermont Electric Supply Co. v. Andrus, 132 Vt. 195 (1974); Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011) | ||
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| Virginia | No statute (common law) | Virginia has no employee-invention-assignment statute, so there is no own-time carve-out and no notice requirement — an assignment clause is bounded by ordinary contract law, the common-law inventor-owns default (with the hired-to-invent exception and the employer's shop right), and the federal patent and copyright overlay; a post-employment holdover clause would most likely be tested under Virginia's narrowly-drawn/not-unduly-burdensome/public-policy reasonableness rule for restraints on competition, layered with Va. Code § 40.1-28.7:8, which since its 2025 and 2026 amendments prohibits covenants not to compete outright for a large covered class — although no Virginia decision found in our review has applied either framework to a holdover invention-assignment clause. | No Virginia invention-assignment statute; Avtec Systems, Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568 (4th Cir. 1994); Home Paramount Pest Control Cos. v. Shaffer, 282 Va. 412 (2011); Va. Code § 40.1-28.7:8 | ||
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| Washington | Statutory carve-out | A Washington employer may require assignment of inventions tied to its business or to the employee's work, but RCW 49.44.140 voids forced assignment of true own-time, own-resource inventions and requires written notice of that carve-out at signing; whether a post-employment holdover clause is enforceable is unsettled in Washington. | RCW 49.44.140–.150; Waterjet Tech., Inc. v. Flow Int'l Corp., 140 Wn.2d 313 (2000) | ||
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| West Virginia | No statute (common law) | West Virginia has no employee-invention-assignment statute, so an assignment clause is bounded only by ordinary contract law, the common-law default rules, and the federal patent and copyright overlay — not a California-style own-time carve-out or notice requirement; absent a written assignment the inventor owns unless hired to invent, the leading West Virginia-connected authority is a Federal Circuit decision enforcing a written present-tense assignment in a West Virginia university dispute, and a post-employment holdover clause would most likely be tested under West Virginia's general restrictive-covenant reasonableness framework — including the new-consideration rule for restraints added mid-employment — though no West Virginia case applying that framework to an invention-assignment clause was found in our review. | No West Virginia invention-assignment statute; Univ. of W. Va. Bd. of Trs. v. VanVoorhies, 278 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Reddy v. Cmty. Health Found. of Man, 298 S.E.2d 906 (W. Va. 1982); Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011) | ||
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| Wisconsin | No statute (common law) | Wisconsin has no employee-invention-assignment statute, so an assignment clause is bounded by ordinary contract law, the common-law default rules, and the federal patent overlay; absent a written assignment the inventor owns unless hired to invent and the employer's fallback is a shop right, and a post-employment holdover clause would most likely be tested for reasonableness under Wis. Stat. § 103.465 — with the Wisconsin twist that an unreasonable covenant is void in its entirety, not judicially trimmed — although no Wisconsin court found in our review has squarely applied § 103.465 to an invention-assignment clause. | No Wisconsin invention-assignment statute; Wis. Stat. § 103.465; Barlow & Seelig Mfg. Co. v. Patch, 232 Wis. 220, 286 N.W. 577 (1939) | ||
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| Wyoming | No statute (common law) | Wyoming has no employee-invention-assignment statute — the word invention appears in the Wyoming Statutes only inside the criminal-code trade-secret definition — so an assignment clause is bounded by ordinary contract law, the common-law defaults the Wyoming Supreme Court adopted in Preston v. Marathon Oil Co. (inventor owns unless hired to invent, plus an employer shop right), and restraint-of-trade limits; continued at-will employment is sufficient consideration for an assignment agreement, an agreement containing a one-year post-termination presumption clause has been enforced under restraint-of-trade reasoning, and for contracts entered into on or after July 1, 2025 a holdover clause that operates as a covenant not to compete is void under Wyo. Stat. § 1-23-108 unless the trade-secret or executive-and-management exceptions apply, with no blue-pencil rescue after Hassler. | No Wyoming invention-assignment statute; Preston v. Marathon Oil Co., 2012 WY 66, 277 P.3d 81 (Wyo. 2012); Wyo. Stat. § 1-23-108 (2025) | ||
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